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This article analyses the various ways in which investment law raises questions of 
change. It distinguishes between changes in international investment norms, and 
changes in a host state’s regulatory system which is subject to the control of such 
norms, and explains how these different manifestations of change relate to the dis-
tinct yet interrelated issues of interpretation and application. The article explains why, 
given features of the contemporary investment regime, on questions of interpretation, 
concerning the content of international investment norms, arbitrators operate within 
wider processes of law-development over which states, as treaty masters, also exercise 
significant influence. In contrast, arbitrators dominate the process of applying inter-
national investment norms to particular investor-state disputes to determine whether 
changes in a host state’s regulatory system breach applicable investment norms. This 
claim is demonstrated in relation to the two most prominent investment treaty stan-
dards: fair and equitable treatment, and the protection against indirect expropriation.
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1 Introduction
It is often observed that investment law, and specifically the application of 
treaty disciplines by arbitral tribunals, involves a challenge of balancing a host 
state’s interest in being able to adapt regulation to changing circumstances 
with an investor’s interest in knowing in advance the regulatory system that 
will apply to its investment.1 The large number of pending or decided cases 
concerning states’ changes to incentive schemes for various forms of renew-
able energy can accurately be described in such terms.2 At the same time, one 
can analyse broader processes of change within norms of investment law, for 
example by tracing innovations developed by arbitral tribunals and reactions 
by states as treaty parties, and vice versa.3 This article aims to provide concep-
tual clarity and context to the observation that investment law, and specifi-
cally investment arbitration, often involves managing questions of change. The 
1   Moshe Hirsch, ‘Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization Clause: Stable Legal 
Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment Law’ (2011) 12(6) JWIT 783, 
783–84; Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International 
Law’ (2005) 20 ICSID Rev–FILJ 1, 45; Vaughan Lowe, ‘Regulation or Expropriation?’ (2002) 
55 CLP 447, 447, 464; Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Unilateral Commitments to Investment Protection: 
Does the Promise of Stability Restrict Environmental Policy Development?’ (2007) 17 YB Intl 
Env L 139, 157 (‘The key problem with state contracts, and investment law in general, is the 
need to balance the legitimate need of the investor for stability with the legitimate need 
of the regulator for flexibility to respond to changing values, risks, and circumstances’). For 
recognition of this point in arbitral jurisprudence see eg Total SA v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability (27 December 2010) para 123; El Paso Energy Int’l Co v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, Award (31 October 2011) para 358; see also Anne van 
Aaken, ‘International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory Analysis’ (2009) 12 JIEL 507 (suggesting from the perspective of contract theory that 
international investment law, including arbitral interpretation, involves finding an optimal 
balance between commitment to the agreed bargain and flexibility in the face of future un-
foreseeable circumstances).
2   Daniel Behn and Malcolm Langford, ‘Trumping the Environment? An Empirical Perspective 
on the Legitimacy of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2017) 18(1) JWIT 14, 39; Björn Arp, 
‘Charanne BV v Spain’ (2016) 110 AJIL 327, 332–33.
3   See eg W Michael Reisman, ‘Canute Confronts the Tide: States versus Tribunals and the 
Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law’ (2015) 30 ICSID 
Rev–FILJ 616; Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: 
The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179; M Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the 
International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP 2015) (also emphasising the influence of non-
governmental organizations and academics); Alec Stone Sweet, Michael Yunsuck Chung and 
Adam Saltzman, ‘Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empirical Analysis of Investor–
State Arbitration’ (forthcoming) JIDS.
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article makes two key contributions. First, it distinguishes between changes in 
international investment norms, and changes in a host state’s regulatory sys-
tem which is subject to the control of such norms, and explains how these 
different manifestations of change relate to the distinct yet interrelated tasks 
of interpretation and application. I explain why, given various features of the 
contemporary investment regime, on questions of interpretation, concerning 
the content of international investment norms as a general matter, arbitrators 
operate within wider processes of law-development over which states, as trea-
ty drafters and treaty parties, also exercise significant influence. In contrast, 
arbitrators dominate the process of applying international investment norms 
to particular investor-state disputes, and determining whether changes in a 
host state’s regulatory system breach relevant investment norms. Second, this 
article traces the two different senses in which questions of change frequently 
arise – namely changes in the content of international investment norms and 
changes in a host state’s regulatory system which is subject to the control of 
such norms – in relation to the two most prominent standards of investment 
protection: fair and equitable treatment (FET), and the protection against 
indirect expropriation without compensation. While arbitrators have made 
notable contributions to changes in the content of these norms as a general 
interpretive matter, states have engaged in widespread reform through treaty 
drafting over the last decade, often as a direct response to prior arbitral in-
terpretations.4 Yet such treaty-based reforms have only partially curtailed the 
room for arbitrators to clarify and develop the meaning of key investment 
norms through the process of interpretation. Furthermore, so long as inves-
tors are provided with access to investor-state arbitration, arbitrators are likely 
to retain a dominant role in applying treaty disciplines to particular disputes. 
Applying the FET and indirect expropriation standards frequently requires ar-
bitrators to determine the permissible margin of regulatory change within the 
host state.
This article proceeds as follows: Part 2 provides a brief overview of previous 
attempts to conceptualise the tension between stability and change in invest-
ment law and international law more generally. It introduces the distinction 
4   Eric De Brabandere, ‘States’ Reassertion of Control over International Investment Law: 
(Re)Defining “Fair and Equitable Treatment” and “Indirect Expropriation” ’ in Andreas 
Kulick (ed), Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (CUP 2016) 285, 308; 
Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State Arbitration: 
On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable Law’ in Zachary Douglas, 
Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E Viñuales (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: 
Bringing Theory into Practice (OUP 2014) 257, 273.
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between interpretation and application, and explains why, given various 
features of the investment regime, the relative influence of arbitrators and 
states differs markedly at these two levels. Part 3 turns to the FET standard. It 
examines changes in the content of the norm, and specifically its requirement 
of a degree of stability in the host state’s regulatory system, brought about both 
through more balanced arbitral interpretations and recent treaty-drafting in-
novations (3.1). It then analyses arbitrators’ application of the FET standard 
in several recently decided cases which have prominently raised its ‘stability’ 
element, to support the argument that in applying the standard adjudicators 
determine the permissible margin of regulatory change in the host state (3.2). 
Part 4 focuses on the indirect expropriation standard. At the level of interpre-
tation, it suggests that arbitrators have made certain notable contributions 
to the meaning of the norm over the last decade through the development 
of a police powers doctrine, however significant changes have also occurred 
through states’ efforts as treaty drafters to refine the meaning of the standard 
(4.1). It then demonstrates that in applying the indirect expropriation standard 
in specific disputes arbitrators often determine the permissible degree of host 
state regulatory change (4.2). Part 5 concludes.
2 Clarifying Different Types of Change: The Distinction Between 
Interpretation and Application
The challenge of ensuring ‘legal certainty through predictable interpretation 
of the law and at the same time … [making] allowance for legal change, with-
out which law cannot live’,5 has a long pedigree in thinking about the role of 
international adjudication within the international legal order, which pre-
dates the rise of investment arbitration.6 For present purposes, however, it is 
sufficient to begin with the contribution of Thomas Franck, who, writing in 
5   Ilmar Tammelo, Treaty Interpretation and Practical Reason: Towards a General Theory of Legal 
Interpretation (Law Book Company 1967) 53.
6   The most important analyses are Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (OUP 1933) 245–59, and generally pt iv (‘Stability and Change in International 
Law’); C Wilfred Jenks, ‘Economic and Social Change and the Law of Nations’ (1973) 138 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 455; Wilfred Jenks, ‘Orthodoxy 
and Innovation in the Law of Nations’ (1971) 57 Proceedings of the British Academy 215. 
Messenger has recently provided a sophisticated account focused on the broader question of 
explaining change in international law, with specific application to World Trade Organization 
law, see Gregory Messenger, The Development of World Trade Organization Law: Examining 
Change in International Law (OUP 2016). Messenger briefly discusses, at ibid 4, the tension
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the 1990s, suggested that the tension between stability and change within the 
international legal order was managed through the ‘rubric’ of fairness, with 
substantive fairness, understood as distributive justice, favouring change, and 
procedural fairness, or right process, favouring ‘stability and order’.7 Notably, 
Franck applied this framework to investment law, suggesting that a host state’s 
‘demand for change’ and investors’ ‘insistence on stability’ was ‘likely to reach 
the public arena as a dispute about the fairness of law’.8 The discourse could 
be specific to a dispute before an arbitral tribunal, or it could be ‘general and 
normative’ at the level of treaty negotiations or debate in other law-developing 
fora. Either way, it would be ‘about balancing the social need to induce capital 
growth against political claims to redistributive justice’, to give the compact be-
tween investors and host governments ‘the elasticity needed to accommodate 
the inevitable tension between the political pull to change and the economic 
rationale for stability’.9
Roland Kläger, building on Franck’s work, presents an account of the FET 
standard as an embodiment of justice, whereby arguments favouring stabil-
ity or right process are ‘found mainly in the lines of jurisprudence of arbitral 
tribunals, such as fair procedure, non-discrimination, the protection of the in-
vestor’s legitimate expectations and transparency’. In contrast: ‘[a]rguments … 
for redistributive change … may be subsumed under the notion of state sover-
eignty, entitling a state to pursue different tax, currency, labour, social or other 
policies’, as well as ‘the label of sustainable development’, which Kläger under-
stands as encompassing social or ecological considerations foregrounded by 
human rights and environmental law.10 Again, the key claim is that in applying 
the FET standard arbitrators must balance competing considerations, some 
favouring stability and others favouring change.11 This reflects that FET is, ac-
cording to Kläger, ‘a sophist norm’ rather than a hard and fast rule, meaning 
part of the fairness discourse, or balancing of competing considerations, oc-
curs at the law-application stage.12
   between stability and change noting it ‘creates numerous challenges for those concerned 
with the effective functioning of a legal system’.
7    Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1998) 7.
8    ibid 441.
9    ibid.
10   Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (CUP 2011) 
148–53.
11   Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Legitimacy and Fairness’ (2010) 11(3) JWIT 435, 452–55.
12   ibid 447–48, 452.
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Martti Koskenniemi, consistent with his broader claims concerning the in-
determinacy of legal argument, has argued that the tendency to speak of bal-
ancing stability and change ‘restates the problem’ because choosing between 
competing claims of stability and change requires evaluating ‘what is equi-
table in certain circumstances and what is not’.13 For Koskenniemi, any choice 
between apparently opposing arguments favouring stability and change must 
rely on an external criterion of justice as no general legal rule exists which 
could resolve the matter in a way that is not open to competing, equally legally 
plausible arguments.14 Koskenniemi is correct that any question of deciding 
between or balancing competing claims of stability and change has to be un-
derstood within the circumstances of a particular case, and doctrine cannot 
provide a general rule which would resolve the issue in a definitive way for 
future cases.15 Indeed, contemporary arbitrators consistently stress that key in-
vestment standards which impact questions of regulatory change must be un-
derstood in a fact-specific manner and do not admit of definitive statements.16 
Koskenniemi’s discussion reminds us that the question in any particular dis-
pute is stability or change for whom and for which interests.17
13   Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (reissue, CUP 2005) 452–55.
14   ibid 452–61.
15   ibid 451, 457, 461.
16   See eg Chemtura Corporation ( formerly Crompton Corporation) v Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award (2 August 2010) para 294 (noting in regard to indirect expropriation 
‘The determination of whether there has been a “substantial deprivation” is a fact-sen-
sitive exercise to be conducted in the light of the circumstances of each case’); Waste 
Management, Inc v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (30 April 2004) para 99 
(FET standard ‘to some extent a flexible one which must be adapted to the circumstances 
of each case’); Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v Canada, ICSID (NAFTA), Award (31 March 
2010) para 210 (‘the concepts of fairness, equitableness and reasonableness cannot be de-
fined precisely: they require to be applied to the facts of each case’); Continental Casualty 
Co v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award (5 September 2008) para 255 (content of 
the FET obligation ‘varies in part depending on the circumstances in which the standard 
is invoked: the concept of fairness being inherently related to keeping justice in variable 
factual contexts’).
17   Koskenniemi (n 13) 461 (noting the question is ‘what kind of and whose consent it is 
that counts and which kind of teleology it is that is working’ – emphasis in the original); 
Todd Weiler, ‘Who, Then, Shall Judge? The Interpretation of International Investment 
Agreements and the Rule of International Law’ in Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2013 (Brill Nijhoff 
2015) 299, 329–30.
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At this point it is useful to distinguish between the concepts of interpretation 
and application. Whereas interpretation refers to ‘determining the meaning of 
a rule’, application is the process of ‘determining the consequences which the 
rule attaches to the occurrence of a given fact’.18 It is important to distinguish 
interpretation and application because, for a variety of reasons which will be 
considered shortly, the relative influence of investment arbitrators and states 
within these two processes differs markedly. That said, it must be remembered 
that the exercises of interpretation and application are never fully separate,19 
particularly in the case of open-textured and evaluative norms such as FET 
where the content of the norm, a matter of interpretation, is partly elaborated 
through its application to specific factual scenarios,20 a task largely undertak-
en by arbitrators.21
On questions concerning the interpretation, or meaning in general, of in-
vestment norms, states have in recent years engaged in widespread clarifica-
tion and reform of investment protection standards through treaty drafting, 
although, as we will see, these efforts have not been entirely successful in re-
moving ambiguities regarding the content of such standards and thus curtail-
ing arbitral discretion.22 Furthermore, recent investment treaties frequently 
provide for interstate committees empowered to adopt binding interpretations 
18   Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Claim for Indemnity – 
Jurisdiction) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 9 (Diss Op Ehrlich) 39; similarly: ‘Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: Comment to Article 19’, reprinted in (1935) 29 
Supplement to the AJIL 938. For further discussion and references see Anastasios 
Gourgourinis, ‘The Distinction Between Interpretation and Application of Norms in 
International Adjudication’ (2011) 2 JIDS 31, 43–48.
19   Roberts (n 3) 179.
20   Reisman (n 3) 617–18; See above text at nn 12 and 16.
21   Arguably, this captures precisely what is problematic about the standard-like nature of 
key investment norms, namely that the content of the norm governing states’ behavior 
only becomes clear at a later time, when the norm is applied by adjudicators in a spe-
cific dispute, see Federico Ortino, ‘Refining the Content and Role of Investment “Rules” 
and “Standards”: A New Approach to International Investment Treaty Making’ (2013) 28 
ICSID Rev–FILJ 152, 153–58.
22   As Yackee has suggested, a limitation of better treaty drafting as a reform strategy is that 
‘states are unlikely to be able to draft, once and for all, a perfectly controlling treaty’ text, 
including due to the inherent ambiguity of language and the inability to predict all future 
scenarios, see Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Controlling the International Investment Law Agency’ 
(2012) 53 Harv Intl L J 391, 424. For overviews of such treaty-drafting reforms, see Caroline 
Henckels, ‘Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Precision in Investment 
Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP’ (2016) 19 JIEL 27; UNCTAD, ‘Taking Stock of IIA 
Reform’ (IIA Issues Note No 1, 2016).
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of the agreements,23 and states have demonstrated some willingness to utilise 
these mechanisms in order to correct arbitral interpretations.24 States also fre-
quently exercise their ability – increasingly provided for explicitly in investment 
treaties – to make submissions as a non-disputing treaty party on the interpre-
tation of their treaties.25 Thus, on questions concerning the  interpretation of 
23   See eg Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the 
European Union (signed 30 October 2016, not yet in force) arts 8.31(3), 8.44(3)(a) 
(CETA) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/>; 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (signed 4 February 2016, not yet in force) art 
27.2(2)(f) (TPP) <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific 
-partnership/tpp-full-text> all accessed 11 September 2017. For a list of other treaties which 
include such a provision, and analysis of how such mechanisms vary, see Kathryn Gordon 
and Joachim Pohl, ‘Investment Treaties over Time – Treaty Practice and Interpretation 
in a Changing World’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2015/02 (2015) 
26–29; see also David Gaukrodger, ‘The Legal Framework Applicable to Joint Interpretive 
Agreements of Investment Treaties’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment 
2016/01 (2016) 5 (noting such provisions increasingly appear in recent treaties but the vast 
majority of investment treaties do not address joint interpretive action). In the absence 
of such a mechanism, the treaty parties’ subsequent agreement, or subsequent practice 
establishing agreement, regarding the interpretation of a treaty must nevertheless be 
taken into account under standard rules of treaty interpretation: Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) arts 31(3)(a), (b). The International Law Commission, in its ongo-
ing work on this topic, takes the view that these ‘authentic means of interpretation’ are 
‘not necessarily conclusive, but more or less authoritative’ in the overall exercise of treaty 
interpretation, see the Commission’s Conclusion 3 [2] and commentary thereto, which it 
has adopted on a first reading: ‘Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-eighth 
Session’ (2016, UN Doc. A/71/10) 132–137.
24   The most famous example is NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘Notes of Interpretation of 
Certain Chapter 11 Provisions’ (31 July 2001) <www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/
CH11understanding_e.asp> accessed 11 September 2017. See also below n 39.
25   In addition to being included in more recent US and Canadian investment treaties, 
such a right appears in Article 1128 of NAFTA and has been frequently utilised by non-
disputing state parties given their long-term interest in the interpretation of that trea-
ty, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment 
Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic Protection?’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Marcelo G Kohen and Jorge E Viñuales (eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute 
Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 307, 312–15. Kaufmann-Kohler considers the basis 
for allowing non-disputing state submissions where the underlying investment treaty 
does not provide for such a right, noting that there is a strong rationale for allowing 
such submissions on questions of treaty interpretation, but not on the application of 
the treaty to the specific facts of the investor-state dispute concerned, ibid 319–26. See 
also UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (ef-
fective as of 1 April 2014) art 5 <www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on 
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investment treaties, arbitrators operate within wider processes of law-devel-
opment, alongside states as treaty masters. Or, as Anthea Roberts puts it, the 
delegation of interpretive power from treaty parties to tribunals is partial, and 
treaty interpretation involves an ongoing dialogue between these two sets of 
actors.26 An important aspect of this process of dialogue is that arbitrators’ 
interpretations of investment treaty provisions frequently have some influ-
ence on future treaty-making.27 ‘Influence’ in this sense can range anywhere 
between arbitral interpretations being codified wholesale in subsequent treaty 
drafting and arbitral interpretations being overridden by disgruntled treaty 
parties.28
In contrast, investment treaties largely do not enable states, as treaty parties, 
to determine the application of relevant standards of investment protection to 
particular investor-state disputes. Of course, many investment treaties allow 
the authorities of the treaty parties, if they agree, to determine the application 
of the treaty to investor claims concerning taxation or prudential measures.29 
-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf> accessed 11 September 2017. For proposals 
as to how such mechanisms could be developed to provide treaty parties with greater 
control over law-development within the regime, see Yackee (n 22) 434–44 (suggesting 
that treaty parties might be given an opportunity to comment on draft awards, or to joint-
ly veto the law-making effects of an award).
26   Roberts (n 3) 180, 193–94.
27   Catharine Titi, ‘The Arbitrator as a Lawmaker: Jurisgenerative Processes in Investment 
Arbitration’ (2013) 14(5) JWIT 829, 843. Note also that pending cases, yet to be decided, 
can influence states’ treaty drafting choices. One example of this is the ‘carve-out’ for 
tobacco control measures included in the TPP (n 23) art 29.5. This would appear to be 
a response to the investor claims brought against Australia and Uruguay in relation to 
such measures. At the time the TPP negations were concluded in October 2015, and 
the text publicly released shortly afterwards, both claims were pending. Both claims were 
subsequently dismissed: Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case 
No 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 December 2015); Philip Morris 
Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v Uruguay ICSID Case No 
ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016).
28   Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Development of International Law by ICSID Tribunals’ (2016) 
31 ICSID Rev–FILJ 728, 737 (distinguishing between instances where treaty drafters take 
guidance from tribunal practices, instances where drafters seek to settle questions left 
open by prior conflicting decisions, and instances where drafters seek to counteract un-
desirable arbitral tendencies).
29   See eg US Model BIT (2012) arts 20(3) and (4), 21(2) <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf>; Free Trade Agreement Between 
Canada and Peru (signed 29 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 2009) arts 819(2), 
820(2), 823(4), 2203(8) <http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/fta-ale/index.aspx?lang=eng>; Free Trade 
Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the 
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However, very few treaties have broadened this mechanism to cover a wider 
range of measures,30 and, in any case, its activation relies on the treaty parties 
reaching agreement, which will not always be forthcoming. In short, invest-
ment arbitrators dominate the process of applying treaty standards to specific, 
fact-intensive investor-state disputes. Thus, to cite Roberts again, as regards the 
role of applying investment treaty standards to specific investor-state disputes 
investment treaty tribunals are ‘trusteelike’ relatively independent interna-
tional tribunals, whereas in relation to interpreting investment treaties and 
developing the law as a general matter the same tribunals are more ‘agentlike’, 
subject to potential override by the treaty parties.31
Building on the above distinction between interpretation and application, 
we can distinguish between arbitrators as actors within broader processes of 
change in investment treaty norms, and arbitrators as managers of change 
within the regulatory system of a host state which is subject to the applica-
People’s Republic of China (signed 7 April 2008, entered into force 1 October 2008) art 
204(4) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2564> all accessed 
11 September 2017. Under such provisions where a joint determination of the competent 
authorities of the treaty parties occurs, the determination typically binds tribunals, or the 
investor is barred from brining a claim or relying on certain treaty provisions. For discus-
sion and further references see Gordon and Pohl (n 23) 29–31.
30   One recent example is the Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (signed 17 June 2015, entered into 
force 20 December 2015) [2015] ATS 15. The treaty provides in Article 9.11.4 that ‘measures 
of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives 
of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order shall not be the 
subject of a claim’ by an investor. If a respondent state receives a request for consulta-
tions from an investor which the state believes is a claim covered by Article 9.11.4, it can 
issue a notice which triggers a 90-day consultation period with the other treaty party, 
see art 9.11.5–6. If the treaty parties agree that the measure concerned is one covered 
by the exception in Article 9.11.4, their decision binds a tribunal, see art 9.18(3). See also 
Anthea Roberts and Richard Braddock, ‘Protecting Public Welfare Regulation Through 
Joint Treaty Party Control: A ChAFTA Innovation’ Columbia FDI Perspectives No 176 
(20 June 2016) (highlighting the novelty of this mechanism).
31   Roberts (n 3) 188; see also Andreas Kulick ‘Reassertion of Control: An Introduction’ in 
Kulick (n 4) 18–21. For discussion of the distinction between delegation to agents and trust-
ees, and its application to international tribunals, see Karen J Alter, ‘Agents or Trustees? 
International Courts in Their Political Context’ (2008) 14 EJIR 33, 38–47; Roberts (n 3) 
186–87; Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of 
International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization’ (2013) 1 J L 
& Courts 61, 64–67; Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel, The Evolution of International 
Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy (OUP 2017) 22–32.
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tion of such norms. Several structural features of the investment regime, as it 
currently exits, help explain why the relative influence of arbitral tribunals dif-
fers at these two levels. The influence of arbitrators over the interpretation, or 
meaning in general, of investment treaty norms is substantially reduced by the 
decentralised and bilaterally constructed nature of the regime. The decision 
of states to (so far) utilize ad hoc tribunals, and avoid creating any permanent 
tribunal or appellate mechanism reduces the relative influence of any one 
tribunal over law-development within the regime.32 The fact that investment 
treaties differ in material respects also leads to arbitrators having less influence 
over issues of law-development than adjudicators within multilateral regimes 
which rely on common underlying texts. Furthermore, because investment 
treaties are generally bilateral or, less commonly, narrow plurilateral, agree-
ments, it is more likely that the treaty parties will be able to override arbitral 
interpretations through authoritative interpretations, or treaty amendments, 
than in large multilateral settings. In all of the above respects the position 
of investment arbitrators can usefully be contrasted with that of the WTO 
Appellate Body: in that regime, the inability of a diverse membership to agree 
upon authoritative interpretations or amendments means that in practice the 
Appellate Body – a tribunal characterised by significant continuity including 
because of its powerful secretariat – has the final say on the meaning of the 
common covered agreements.33
A distinction should, however, be drawn between the influence over treaty 
interpretation of particular investment treaty tribunals and that of investment 
treaty tribunals collectively. The latter, which has largely been staffed by a 
small number of frequently appointed arbitrators,34 has had an unprecedent-
ed number of opportunities to determine the meaning of the same or similar 
treaty provisions and has driven the emerging ‘jurisprudence constante’ of 
the regime.35 Thus, if one focuses on investment treaty tribunals collectively, 
32   Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart 2009) 157–59.
33   Other commentators have also noted that the small number of principals or treaty parties 
in the investment context means that there is much more potential for political override 
of adjudicators’ decisions than in large multilateral settings such as the WTO, see eg Jacob 
Katz Cogan, ‘Competition and Control in International Adjudication’ (2008) 48 Virginia 
J Intl L 411, 431; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Political Constraints on International Courts’ in Cesare 
PR Romano, Karen J Alter and Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (OUP 2013) 483, 496.
34   See eg Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’ (2014) 25 EJIL 387.
35   Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante’ 
in Colin B Picker, Isabella D Bunn and Douglas W Arner (eds), International Economic 
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rather than particular ad hoc tribunals, the relative influence of adjudicators 
over ongoing processes of interpretation would rival and perhaps even surpass 
that of treaty parties collectively. The use of permanent appellate tribunals, 
as included in a few recent investment treaties,36 and the possible creation 
of a multilateral investment court,37 has the potential to increase adjudica-
tors’ relative influence over issues of interpretation by reducing the number 
of conflicting adjudicatory views. Permanent tribunals can also build up their 
‘semantic authority’, or ability to shape legal discourse given their institutional 
reputation, over time.38 Yet much will depend upon the range of investment 
treaties over which states choose to give any permanent tribunal jurisdiction, 
and the extent to which investors choose to bring cases to such a tribunal. To 
the extent that substantive investment law continues to be characterised by 
bilateral or narrow plurilateral treaties substantial scope for treaty party over-
ride will remain, notwithstanding any use of permanent tribunals. Indeed, at 
the same time as committing to ‘work expeditiously towards the creation of ’ a 
multilateral investment court, Canada and the European Union signalled their 
intention to take very seriously their future role in monitoring and attempting 
to control adjudicators’ interpretations.39
Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart 2008) 265–80; Stone Sweet, Chung and 
Saltzman (n 3) (also emphasising the disproportionate role played by a small number of 
repeat arbitrators in developing precedent within the investment treaty system).
36   CETA (n 23) arts 8.27–8.30; EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (Agreed Text of January 
2016, not yet signed nor in force) ch 8(II) (‘Investment’), s 3(4), arts 12–14 <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf> accessed 20 October 2017.
37   The EU and Canada have recently initiated discussions with other states regarding the 
creation of such a court. For a list of relevant developments and documents see European 
Commission, ‘The Multilateral Investment Court Project’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608> accessed 20 October 2017.
38   For the concept of semantic authority, see Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes 
International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (OUP 2012) 63. Apart from 
the semantic authority of a tribunal as an institution, ad hoc tribunals can obviously draw 
upon the reputation-based authority of individual members but this is also true of per-
manent tribunals.
39   Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Interpretive Instrument on the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and 
its Member States’ Doc 13541/16 (27 October 2016) paras 6(e) (stating the treaty parties are 
‘committed to using these provisions to avoid and correct any misinterpretation of CETA 
by Tribunals’), and 6(i). For another discussion of the potential for any shift to permanent 
tribunals to increase the relative power of adjudicators, and the consequent need to for 
treaty parties to consider a range of control mechanisms, including joint interpretations, 
see Mark Feldman, ‘Investment Arbitration Appellate Mechanism Options: Consistency, 
13Investment Law and change | doi 10.1163/22119000-12340080
Journal of World Investment & Trade (2018) 1–35
Beyond its structural features, the aims or telos of the investment treaty 
regime also explain why arbitrators play a prominent role in applying treaty 
norms, and deciding on the permissible degree of change within the host 
state’s regulatory system, in particular disputes. Although ensuring stability in 
the host state’s regulatory system is not an explicit aim of most investment 
treaties,40 it is clear that the BIT regime was designed to exercise a degree of 
control over public decision-making in developing, capital-importing states, as 
a means of attracting foreign investment flows and ultimately promoting the 
economic development of the treaty parties.41 Consistent with this aim, the 
substantive norms of the regime cut deeply into host states’ sovereign regula-
tory sphere and apply to an extremely wide range of conduct. As we will see 
in relation to the FET and indirect expropriation standards, by applying such 
norms to particular disputes, arbitrators play a key role in deciding upon the 
‘the proper allocation of risk in the modern regulatory state’.42 Such determi-
nations go to the heart of the governance function performed by investment 
treaty arbitration in developing acceptable standards of host state conduct.43 
Accuracy, and Balance of Power’ (2017) ICSID Rev–FILJ (forthcoming) <doi:10.1093/
icsidreview/six009>.
40   Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Investment Treaties and Transition from Authoritarian Rule’ 
(2014) 15(5–6) JWIT 965, 966–68. Some older US BITs mention regulatory stability in 
their preambles, see eg Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment 
(signed 14 November 1991, entered into force 20 October 1994) <http://investmentpolicy 
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/127> accessed 11 September 2017. See, however, 
Continental Casualty (n 16) para 258 (interpreting the US-Argentina BIT and holding that 
stability is not itself an objective of the Treaty but a ‘precondition for one of the two basic 
objects of the Treaty, namely the promotion of the investment flow, rather than being 
related to its other objective, that of granting protection for investments’).
41   Federico Ortino, ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (2013) 24 Am Rev Intl 
Arb 437, 440–44; Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do Bits Really Work: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 HILJ 67, 
77; Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(OUP 2010) 3–4; Marc Jacob and Stephan W Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Content, 
Practice, Method’ in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (Hart 2015) paras 143–44; Continental Casualty(n 16) para 258.
42   Newcombe (n 1) 7.
43   Regarding the governance function of investment treaty arbitration, see eg Benedict 
Kingsbury and Stephan W Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ 
in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 5, 5–6, 23–26; Ortino (n 41) 443–46.
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The concern is that the investment regime, as its least reflective, tends to 
operate with a default bias against change in the regulatory system of the host 
state which is fundamentally misaligned with the dynamic and unpredictable 
policy challenges that states face.44 That said, many of the more recent arbi-
tral interpretations and treaty drafting innovations analysed in the following 
parts suggest that the regime is becoming more sensitive to the need of ac-
commodating legitimate regulatory change, consistent with the broader thesis 
that the regime is evolving towards a more complicated and balanced goal of 
sustainable development.45
3 FET: Distinguishing Changes in the Meaning of the Norm and 
Managing Host State Regulatory Change by Applying the Norm
3.1 Meaning of the Norm: Shifting Views Regarding the Stability Element 
of FET
One of the most controversial aspects of the FET standard concerns the de-
gree to which it imposes a requirement of stability in the legal and regulatory 
system of the host state.46 As the FET standard is notoriously fact specific,47 
much of what is at stake in this debate concerns questions of application, or 
determining what the standard requires in particular circumstances, an issue 
which will be considered below. Nevertheless, at the level of interpretation, 
or the meaning in general of the standard, there is a notable shift under-
44   For criticism along these lines see David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic 
Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (CUP 2008) 8, 37, 236; Gus Van 
Harten, ‘Investment Rules and the Denial of Change’ (2010) 60 UTLJ 893; Gus Van Harten, 
‘Foreign Investor Protection and Climate Action: A New Price Tag for Urgent Policies’ 
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No 21/2016 (2016) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697555> accessed 11 September 2017; Lise Johnson and 
Oleksandr Volkov, ‘State Liability for Regulatory Change: How International Investment 
Rules Are Overriding Domestic Law’ (2014) 5(1) ITN 3.
45   For argument that the telos of investment treaties is shifting in this direction, based on re-
cent treaty drafting trends and an evolutionary interpretation of earlier treaty preambles 
see Federico Ortino, ‘Investment Treaties, Sustainable Development and Reasonableness 
Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing’ (2017) 30 LJIL 71, 77–83.
46   For an illuminating analysis of this aspect of the FET standard see Hirsch (n 1); see also 
Richard C Chen, ‘A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes’ (2015) 
40 YJIL 295, 313–335 (outlining potential ways to reconceptualise the stability aspect of 
the FET standard in light of contract law approaches to changed circumstances and risk 
allocation).
47   See above n 16.
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way regarding the stability element of the FET standard which is occurring 
both through more balanced arbitral interpretations and treaty-drafting 
innovations.48 While investment treaties have until recently not further de-
fined the meaning of the terms ‘fair and equitable’, one element of a number 
of early arbitral interpretations of the standard was that they saw it as ‘insepa-
rable from stability’ in the host state’s regulatory system,49 and suggested that 
investors could have legitimate expectations arising from the general state of 
regulation, at the time of investing, in the absence of specific assurances or 
a stabilization clause.50 Among the most striking examples are statements of 
the Tecmed and Metalclad tribunals which suggested than an investor has the 
48   For a similar reading of a shift in arbitral interpretations see Ursula Kriebaum, ‘FET and 
Expropriation in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT’ (2014) 15(3–4) JWIT 454, 471. Another 
aspect of the FET standard which has seen an active dialogue between states as treaty 
parties and tribunals concerns the norm’s relationship with the customary international 
minimum standard. This example is not treated in detail by this article because it is al-
ready well-known in the literature. In short, while the NAFTA treaty parties tied the FET 
standard to the customary minimum standard through their 2001 authoritative interpre-
tation (above n 24) – a move which has since been emulated by other states in drafting 
treaties – the effectiveness of this technique in curtailing the scope of FET is limited 
because many tribunals have taken the view that the customary minimum standard has 
itself evolved. A particularly bold example of this view is the Merrill tribunal, which held 
FET had become custom and that the broader modern customary minimum standard 
‘protects against all such acts or behaviour that might infringe a sense of fairness, equity 
and reasonableness’, see Merrill & Ring (n 16) paras 205–13. In contrast, other tribunals 
have taken the view that while the customary minimum standard is being applied to a 
wider range of situations than was historically the case ‘the required severity of the con-
duct’ must be maintained, see Cargill, Inc v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/Z, Award 
(18 September 2009) para 284; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award (8 June 2009) paras 612–16. As others have suggested, the more expan-
sive arbitral interpretations of the customary minimum standard are an example of arbi-
trators simply moving ‘the goal post’ in response to this treaty-drafting technique, without 
sufficiently demonstrating the claimed evolution in custom, see Patrick Dumberry, The 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: A Guide to NAFTA Case Law on Article 1105 (Kluwer 
Law International 2013) 107–8; Stephan W Schill, The Multilateralization of International 
Investment Law (CUP 2009) 274–75.
49   CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005) 
paras 276–77.
50   Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Case No 3467, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (1 July 2004) paras 183, 185; Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP 
v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007) paras 260–66; Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Award (28 September 2007) paras 
298, 300, 303; Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(12 November 2010) para 285.
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right to know, before investing, the totality of the applicable regulatory system 
in order ‘to be able to plan its investment’.51
In contrast, a key idea which animates a host of recent arbitral interpreta-
tions of the FET standard is that regulatory change is generally permissible, 
subject only to restrictions where specific assurances were given to an investor.52 
These more recent awards have emphasised that the FET standard cannot be 
interpreted as equivalent to a stabilization clause, and host states retain the 
ability to adjust regulation to changing economic and social conditions.53 A 
key part of this interpretive shift has been to establish that the FET standard 
requires assessing the reasonableness of the investor’s expectations within the 
totality of the ‘political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions pre-
51   Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, Award 
(29 May 2003) para 154; Metalclad Corp v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award 
(30 August 2000) para 76 (‘all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, 
completing and successfully operating investments made, or intended to be made, under 
the Agreement should be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of an-
other Party’).
52   William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon 
of Delaware, Inc v Canada, PCA Case No 2009-04, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability (17 March 2015) para 572; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case 
No ARB/05/8, Award (11 September 2007) paras 330–33, 338; Saluka Investments BV (The 
Netherlands) v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (17 March 2006) paras 304–6; 
Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v Ecuador, PCA Case No 2012-2, UNCITRAL, Award 
(15 March 2016) paras 6.61–6.62; Toto Costruzioni Generali SPA v Lebanon, ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/12, Award (7 June 2012) para 244; Blusun SA, Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael 
Stein v Italy, ICSID Case No ARB/14/3, Award (27 December 2016) paras 319(4)–(5), 
367–74.
53   Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016) paras 607, 628; Philip 
Morris v Uruguay (n 27) paras 422, 426; El Paso (n 1) paras 350, 352, 367–68; EDF (services) 
Ltd v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, Award (8 October 2009) paras 217–19; AES 
Summit Generation Ltd and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/22, 
Award (23 September 2010) para 9.3.29; Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Ecuador, ICSID Case No 
ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on Liability (12 September 
2014) para 586; Ioan Micula et al v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Award 
(11 December 2013) paras 529, 666, 673; Electrabel SA v Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (30 November 2012) 
paras 7.77–7.79. For recognition of this point with qualification see Total (n 1) paras 
115–23; Impregilo SpA v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, Award (21 June 2011) paras 
290–91; Eiser Infrastructure Ltd and Energia Solar Luxembourg Sàrl v Spain, ICSID Case 
No ARB/13/36, Award (4 May 2017) paras 362–63, 382.
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vailing in the host State’.54 This interpretation operates to limit the investor’s 
legitimate expectations in light of the objective circumstances prevailing in 
the host state.55 Clearly, such an approach places great emphasis on the fact-
specific application of the FET standard by tribunals.56 Nevertheless, staying 
with the issue of interpretation of the content of the FET standard as a general 
matter, the shift in arbitral views means it is now clear that where circumstanc-
es change – for example through the onset of an economic or public health 
crisis – investors must expect that regulation will be adjusted accordingly.57 
Furthermore, as the Philip Morris v Uruguay tribunal put it, the FET standard 
does: ‘not preclude governments from enacting novel rules, even if these are in 
advance of international practice, provided these have some rational basis and 
are not discriminatory … [It] does not guarantee that nothing should be done 
by the host State for the first time’.58 Yet like most arbitral interpretations of the 
FET standard, the Tribunal left open that some regulatory changes might ‘ex-
ceed the exercise of the host State’s normal regulatory power in pursuance of a 
public interest’ and modify the regulatory framework relied upon when invest-
ing ‘outside of the acceptable margin of change’.59 Thus, while contemporary 
interpretations of the FET standard have become much more accommodating 
of legitimate regulatory change, there is no hiding that it is arbitrators them-
selves who determine the ‘acceptable margin of [regulatory] change’.
54   Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/04/19, 
Award (18 August 2008) para 339; Saluka (n 52) para 304; Total SA v Argentina (n 1) para 123; 
Toto v Lebanon (n 52) para 245; Micula (n 53) para 670. See also the Awards in Mamidoil, 
Urbaser, and Perenco, all discussed below part 3.2.
55   El Paso (n 1) para 358; Teinver SA, Transportes de Cercanías SA and Autobuses Urbanos 
del Sur SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/09/1, Award (21 July 2017) para 667; For the 
suggestion that the obligation to provide a reasonable level of legal stability could be 
separated from the concept of legitimate expectations, so that the former involves a test 
focused entirely on the state’s circumstances, rather than the investor’s expectations, see 
Simon Maynard, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Interpretation of the “Legal Stability 
Obligation” ’ (2016) 1 EILAR 99.
56   AES v Hungary (n 53) para 9.3.30 (‘Therefore, to determine the scope of the stable condi-
tions that a state has to encourage and create is a complex task given that it will always 
depend on the specific circumstances that surrounds the investor’s decision to invest and 
the measures taken by the state in the public interest’).
57   Murphy Exploration & Production Company – International v Ecuador, PCA, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Final Award (6 May 2016) para 276; Urbaser (n 53) para 628; Continental Casualty 
(n 16) para 258.
58   Philip Morris v Uruguay (n 27) para 430.
59   ibid para 423, partially quoting El Paso (n 1) para 402.
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Recent treaty-drafting practices reveal significant efforts by states to curtail 
the meaning of the FET standard and specifically its stability element. A no-
table development is the FET provision within the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (CETA). 
CETA moves to what is intended as an exhaustive list of the types of conduct 
which breach the standard – thus reducing the discretion delegated to arbitra-
tors over the meaning of the norm – and excludes any reference, within the 
proscribed conduct, to stability in the host state’s regulatory system.60 A very 
similar provision was proposed by the EU within the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations.61 The grounds for liability under 
the FET standard are instead limited to such high thresholds as treatment 
which constitutes a ‘fundamental breach of due process … in judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings’ or ‘manifest arbitrariness’.62 Yet because these terms 
are open-ended and evaluative, significant discretion is still delegated to adju-
dicators with regard to both interpretation, or determining the precise content 
of such terms, and applying them to specific factual situations.63 CETA’s FET 
clause further provides that tribunals may consider, in applying the standard, 
‘whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a cov-
ered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the 
investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but 
that the Party subsequently frustrated’.64 While this appears to be intended to 
restate the principle, established in arbitral jurisprudence, that specific assur-
ances are a decisive consideration in relation to the creation of legitimate ex-
pectations, and any obligation to provide regulatory stability, more could have 
been done to clarify this aspect of the norm’s content. In particular, something 
may have been said about the type of conduct from which legitimate expecta-
tions can arise – a matter on in which arbitral tribunals have advanced cer-
tain views65 – including whether such representations must be in writing and 
60   CETA (n 23) art 8.10(1)–(2). However, it is not explicitly stated that the types of listed 
conduct which breach the FET standard are exhaustive, so some doubt remains, see De 
Brabandere (n 4) 300.
61   European Union, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – Trade in Services, 
Investment and E-Commerce – Chapter II: Investment’ (12 November 2015) art 3(1)–(2) 
(hereinafter: TTIP Proposal) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/ 
tradoc_153955.pdf> accessed 11 September 2017.
62   CETA (n 23) art 8.10(2)(b)(c).
63   Henckels (n 22) 37, 40. See also above text at nn 19–21.
64   CETA (n 23) art 8.10(4).
65   See eg LG&E Energy Corp et al v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability 
(3 October 2006) para 130 (suggesting legitimate expectations of an investor must be 
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whether the representations must be made to a specific investor.66 States as 
treaty parties could also further clarify the types of circumstances in which it 
is permissible for host states to act contrary to legitimate investor expectations 
once they are established.67 A more successful example of states’ attempts to 
clarify the meaning of the FET standard, and make it more accommodating of 
regulatory change, is perhaps CETA’s provision that a host state’s decision not 
to issue, renew, or maintain a subsidy does not constitute a breach of invest-
ment protection obligations in the absence of specific commitments under a 
law or contract to the contrary.68 The next Part turns to the role of tribunals in 
applying the FET standard to specific disputes, and demonstrates how this in-
volves adjudicating on the permissible margin of host state regulatory change.
3.2 Applying the FET Standard: Determining the Permissible Margin of 
Host State Regulatory Change
This Part focuses in greater detail on a limited number of recent cases which 
have foregrounded the issue of how to apply the FET standard in a manner 
which is sensitive to the host state’s interest in being able to adjust regula-
tion to evolving circumstances. A useful starting point is provided by the 2015 
award in Mamidoil v Albania, where the Tribunal understood the FET standard 
as protecting investors from ‘inacceptable and inappropriate changes of con-
ditions and circumstances by the State’ while recognising ‘a State’s legitimate 
interest and right to change conditions reasonably for public policy purposes’.69 
The case concerned an investment in the construction and operation of an oil 
container terminal at a port and the host state’s decision to close the port to 
petroleum tankers as part of a rezoning aimed at environmental remediation. 
‘enforceable by law’); Continental Casualty (n 16) para 261 (suggesting the specificity of 
the alleged undertaking must be considered as ‘political statements have the least legal 
value … general legislative statements engender reduced expectations’ and contractual 
obligations ‘generate as a rule legal rights and therefore expectations of compliance’); 
Blusun (n 52) paras 367–71.
66   Kriebaum (n 48) 478; Henckels (n 22) 38.
67   Henckels (n 22) 38–39 (highlighted that CETA only clarifies that such a departure from 
legitimate expectations would have to be ‘manifestly arbitrary’ to constitute a FET viola-
tion, which still leaves substantial discretion to arbitrators).
68   CETA (n 23) art 8.9(3); see also art 8.9(2) concerning the modification of host state laws 
generally. The EU’s TTIP Proposal (n 61) contained the same language regarding the 
removal of subsidies and was more explicit regarding the permissibility of regulatory 
change in general, see arts 2.2, 2.3. Compare TPP (n 23) art 9.6(4)–(5).
69   Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe SA v Albania, ICSID Case No ARB/11/24, 
Award (30 March 2015) paras 634, 703. See also paras 613–18.
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In finding that the zoning change was as a legitimate exercise of sovereign 
power and ‘did not lead to unreasonable instability’,70 the Tribunal empha-
sised that Albania was a country in transition from a communist regime, which 
had a pressing need to modernise its infrastructure with limited resources.71 
Thus, investors could not expect the ‘same results of stability as in as in Great 
Britain, USA or Japan.’72 Furthermore, no specific assurances had been given 
to the investor regarding the use of the port,73 and the measures were of a 
general nature, affecting all companies operating at the port.74 Albania had 
in fact pursued its modernisation process ‘in a gradual way’, and the potential 
policy changes were first communicated to the investor at a point when it still 
retained significant flexibility, not having made the bulk of its investment.75 In 
short, the Award is a prime example of the manner in which investment arbi-
trators, by applying the FET standard, adjudicate on the permissible degree of 
change within the host state’s regulatory system.
The role of investment arbitrators in adjudicating on host state regulatory 
change is further thrown into relief by the recent Urbaser v Argentina award. 
Like numerous other investment arbitrations, this case concerned emergency 
measures adopted by Argentina in response to its economic crisis which affect-
ed a concession for the supply of public utilities, specifically water and sewage 
services in Buenos Aires. A key contribution of the Urbaser award is to embed 
the parties’ contractual relationship within the wider legal and social context. 
The Tribunal emphasised that while an ‘investor’s expectations … are usually 
measured on the basis of the contractual commitments … these contractual 
rights should not be considered in isolation’,76 and must be understood within 
a wider ‘legal environment also covering core interests of the host State, as pro-
tected by sources of law prevailing over the Contract, based on international 
or on constitutional law’.77 Specifically, Argentina’s obligation to guarantee the 
right to water to millions of its constituents was ‘the framework within which’ 
the investor’s expectations had to be assessed.78 Thus, the Tribunal held that 
the requirement under the FET standard to treat the investor with transpar-
ency could not mean that the investor would be protected from ‘any change of 
70   ibid para 657.
71   ibid paras 625–29.
72   ibid para 626.
73   ibid paras 644, 651.
74   ibid para 661.
75   ibid paras 720–24. See also paras 704–7.
76   Urbaser (n 53) para 619.
77   ibid para 622. See also paras 619–21.
78   ibid para 624.
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the circumstances in the lifetime of the investment … [which] had not been 
transparent from the outset’.79 Instead, the investor had to be ‘aware of the 
State’s commitment to deal with situations and problems’ which may emerge 
over time ‘and were impossible to anticipate’.80 Nevertheless, the FET standard 
required that ‘the basic expectations of the investor in respect of the fate of its 
investment … [were] taken care of by the host State when reacting to unfore-
seen circumstances’.81 Applying this standard, the Tribunal found a breach of 
the FET standard not because of Argentina’s adoption of emergency measures, 
which were viewed as justified,82 but because of its refusal to seriously engage 
with the investor in renegotiating the concession, in light of the changed cir-
cumstances.83 Again, it is the international tribunal, through its fact-intensive 
application of the FET standard, which has ultimately determined the permis-
sible degree of change within the host state’s regulatory system.
A third set of cases which squarely raise the question of the ‘acceptable mar-
gin of change’84 within the host state’s regulatory system are those disputes 
arising out of Ecuador’s windfall profits tax enacted in the context of an unex-
pected rise in oil prices. By way of context, the participation contracts between 
Ecuador and foreign oil companies relevant to these disputes did not contain 
stabilization clauses but provisions which required the parties to renegoti-
ate the contract, in order to restore the underlying economic bargain, in the 
event of certain ‘trigger’ events.85 Thus, both the Murphy and Perenco tribunals 
quickly concluded that the oil companies could not ‘reasonably expect that 
the contracts would be completely immunised from future legislative or other 
measures’86 given the state’s interest as sovereign over its natural resources in a 
context of ‘exceptional price rises’.87 Both of these Tribunals held that Ecuador’s 
79   ibid para 628.
80   ibid.
81   ibid. See also paras 631–32.
82   ibid paras 716–38.
83   ibid para 845. See generally paras 813–45. Note, however, that this treaty breach was held 
not to be the cause of the Claimant’s loss, ibid paras 846–47. Other awards concerning 
Argentina’s emergency measures have also held that it was Argentina’s failure to seriously 
engage with the investor to readjust the contractual framework, in light of unforeseen 
circumstances, which constituted a violation of the FET standard, see eg Impregilo (n 53) 
paras 325–31.
84   El Paso (n 1) para 402.
85   Perenco v Ecuador (n 53) para 562; Murphy v Ecuador (n 57) para 279; Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No ARB/06/11, Award and Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Stern (5 October 2012) para 12.
86   Perenco v Ecuador (n 53) paras 578, 588, 591.
87   Murphy v Ecuador (n 57) para 276.
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measure, as initially enacted at 50% of exceptional revenues, did not breach 
the FET standard.88 Instead, it was Ecuador’s increasing of the state’s share 
of exceptional revenues to 99%, combined with a series of coercive measures 
designed to force the oil companies to accept a shift from participation to ser-
vice contracts, which violated their legitimate expectations that any contrac-
tual rebalancing would occur through a mutually agreed process.89 Like the 
Urbaser award, these tribunals embedded the parties’ contractual relationship 
within the relevant social, political, and economic context.90 Also similarly to 
Urbaser, it was the host state’s failure to seriously negotiate with the investor 
to rebalance the contract, in the context of unforeseen circumstances, which 
constituted the FET breach, rather than the decision to respond to changed 
circumstances per se, which was viewed as a legitimate regulatory determina-
tion. Thus, in assessing treaty-based liability, arbitrators arrived at a reconcili-
ation of the competing interests which resembles the compromise contained 
in some types of adaptation clauses within investor-state contracts, namely 
that where the economic equilibrium of the contract is affected there is an 
obligation to negotiate a rebalancing of the contract or to pay compensation.91 
88   ibid para 280; Perenco v Ecuador (n 53) para 593 (noting at paras 592–94 that it was open to 
the Claimant to attempt to renegotiate the contract); Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability (14 December 2012), did not address the 
consistency of Ecuador’s measures with the FET standard because the Tribunal had ear-
lier found it lacked jurisdiction over this part of the claim, see para 85.
89   Murphy v Ecuador (n 57) paras 282, 292–93; Perenco v Ecuador (n 53) paras 606–7.
90   The same cannot be said for the reasoning of the majority in Occidental v Ecuador, Award 
(n 85) paras 523–27, which held that Ecuador’s initial measure, enacted at 50% of excep-
tional revenues, constituted a breach of the FET standard, offering little reasoning be-
yond the fact that it constituted a breach of contract. Contrast the Dissenting Opinion of 
Arbitrator Stern who noted the general ability of states to alter their tax regimes and held 
that Ecuador’s measures did not trigger the contractual renegotiation clause, let alone 
rise to the level of a treaty breach, ibid, Dissent, paras 9–13.
91   See Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Environmental 
Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses’ (2008) 
1 JWELB 158, 161, 165, 167; For background on the operation of contractual stabilization 
and adaptation clauses see AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The Pursuit of Stability in International 
Energy Investment Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends’ (2008) 1 JWELB 
121, 122–34; Piero Bernardini, ‘Stabilization and Adaptation in Oil and Gas Investments’ 
(2008) 1 JWELB 98, 100–10; Peter D Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The 
Pursuit of Stability (OUP 2010) 68–94; Klaus Peter Berger, ‘Renegotiation and Adaptation 
of International Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators’ 
(2003) 36 Vanderbilt J Transnatl L 1347, 1357–80. Suggestions for rethinking the role of sta-
bilization or adaptation clauses given investment treaty law’s acceptance of certain types 
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The key point is that in all of the above examples it is investment arbitrators, 
by applying the FET standard, who ultimately determine the permissible mar-
gin of regulatory change open to the host state in responding to unforeseen 
circumstances.
4 Change and the Protection Against Indirect Expropriation
4.1 Changes in the Meaning of the Norm
This Part considers the interpretive dialogue between treaty parties and tribu-
nals which has contributed to the evolution of the meaning of the protection 
against indirect expropriation over the last decade or so. The starting point 
here is to note that prior to the last ten years, most investment treaties con-
tained a guarantee against direct and indirect expropriations without adding 
further detail.92 Accordingly, arbitral tribunals were left substantial discre-
tion in giving meaning to the concept of indirect expropriation. At the level of 
contributions by arbitral tribunals, a significant development in the meaning 
of the indirect expropriation standard has been the recognition, and articula-
tion in different formulations, of a police powers doctrine. As the Philip Morris 
v Uruguay Tribunal observed, while a police powers doctrine was recognised in 
customary international law prior to the rise of investment treaty arbitration, 
the principle:
did not find immediate recognition in investment treaty decisions. But a 
consistent trend in favor of differentiating the exercise of police powers 
from indirect expropriation emerged after 2000. During this latter period, 
a range of investment decisions have contributed to develop the scope, 
content and conditions of the State’s police powers doctrine93
of legitimate regulatory change, and the need to adapt regulation in response to environ-
mental and other policy problems are provided in Cotula (n 91); Antoine Martin, ‘Stability 
in Contemporary Investment Law: Reconsidering the Role and Shape of Contractual 
Commitments in Light of Recent Trends’ (2013) 10 Manchester JIEL 38. Regarding the 
normative questions raised by this area of practice, see especially Tienhaara (n 1) 159–67.
92   Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection Under Investment Treaties: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis (CUP 2014) 230; UNCTAD, ‘Taking Stock’ (n 22) 9 (reporting from a 
sample of 862 BITs that of those treaties signed between 1962–2011 only 4% contained 
criteria further defining the meaning of indirect expropriation).
93   Philip Morris v Uruguay (n 27) para 295.
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In understanding this apparent shift in arbitral interpretations it should be 
noted that there are relatively few investment treaty tribunals which have re-
fused to allow any form of police powers exception by holding that a measure’s 
purpose is irrelevant to whether it constitutes an indirect expropriation.94 One 
stark example is provided by the Metalclad award which dismissed the rel-
evance of the ‘motivation or intent’ behind a provincial decree, adopted on 
purportedly ecological grounds, which was held to constitute an indirect ex-
propriation.95 While other early NAFTA awards had noted the existence of a 
police powers exception,96 in retrospect a seminal contribution seems to have 
been made by an oft-cited passage of the Methanex award that:
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation 
for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process 
and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments 
had been given by the regulating government97
94   Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/97/3, Award (21 August 2007) paras 7.5.20–7.5.21; Siemens AG v Argentina, ICSID 
Case No ARB/02/8, Award (6 February 2007) para 270; Marion Unglaube and Reinhard 
Unglaube v Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, Award (16 May 2012) 
paras 213–18. See also Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Interim Award 
(26 June 2000) paras 96, 99.
95   Metalclad (n 51) paras 109–11. The Tribunal’s determination that Mexico’s earlier denial of 
a permit constituted an indirect expropriation also placed little weight on the environ-
mental reasons said to be behind the decision, ibid paras 92, 106–7.
96   SD Myers, Inc v Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Partial Award (13 November 2000) paras 
281–82; Marvin Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (16 December 
2002) paras 105–6, 112.
97   Methanex Corporation v USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award (3 August 2005) pt 
IV ch D para 7. In reading this statement it should be noted that there is an important 
question of how the reference to ‘public purpose’, as a condition of a police powers doc-
trine which provides a justification for non-compensation, interacts with the criterion 
of public purpose that is a condition of a lawful expropriation under investment trea-
ties and customary international law. One answer to this apparent tension is that the 
police powers exception concerns a much narrower concept of public purpose which 
does not cover all forms of domestic regulation. Specifically, the kinds of public purposes 
that may justify non-compensation are essentially public order and morality, protection 
of the public against human health or environmental risks, and taxation, see generally 
Newcombe (n 1) 26–43. For a contrary argument that the Methanex award did not have 
a substantial impact on subsequent arbitral decision-making, see Kyla Tienhaara and 
Todd Tucker, ‘Regulating Foreign Investment: Methanex Revisited’ in Chin Leng Lim (ed), 
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The existence of such a police powers exception has since been affirmed by nu-
merous tribunals as a matter of legal principle, whether or not they have found 
that an expropriation occurred on the facts of the case.98 However, there are 
substantial differences within the formulations. In contrast to the Methanex 
formulation, cited above, numerous tribunals have imposed the condition that 
any regulatory measure must be proportionate to the public interest being pur-
sued, having regard to the impact on protected investor interests.99 This is no-
table because the introduction of proportionality balancing into the indirect 
expropriation norm has occurred through arbitral interpretations of the norm, 
drawing on European human rights jurisprudence.100
The evolution of the indirect expropriation standard is, however, only partly 
a story of shifting tribunal interpretations. A landmark development in this 
area was the introduction within the 2004 Model BITs of the United States 
and Canada of remarkably similar Annexes which provided a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to be considered in determining whether an indirect expropria-
tion had occurred, and a general exclusion for non-discriminatory regulatory 
measures.101 These treaty-drafting techniques have been emulated in nu-
merous investment treaties over the last decade,102 and further developed in 
some of the newest instruments considered below. Notably, such treaty-based 
Alternative Visions of the International Law on Foreign Investment: Essays in Honour of 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (CUP 2016) 255.
98   Saluka (n 52) para 262; Chemtura (n 16) para 266; Copper Mesa (n 52) para 6.60; Burlington 
(n 85) para 506; WNC Factoring Ltd v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2014-34, UNCITRAL, 
Award (22 February 2017) para 400(e); Continental Casualty (n 16) paras 276, 278.
99   Tecmed (n 51) paras 121–22; Philip Morris v Uruguay (n 27) paras 305–7; Azurix Corp v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006) paras 311–12; El Paso (n 1) paras 
233–34; LG&E (n 65) para 195.
100   Tecmed (n 51) para 122. For consideration of the appropriateness of this analogy, see 
eg José E Alvarez, ‘The Use (and Misuse) of European Human Rights Law in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement’ in Franco Ferrari (ed), The Impact of EU Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Juris 2017) 519.
101   US Model BIT (2004) Annex B <www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf>; 
Canada Model FIPA (2004) Annex B.13(1) <www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf> all accessed 11 September 2017.
102   See eg 2012 US Model BIT (n 29) Annex B(4); Canada-Peru FTA (n 29) Annex 8.12.1; 
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (signed 
27 February 2009, entered into force 1 January 2010) [2010] ATS 1, ch 11, Annex, (3)-(4). 
See also Tienhaara and Tucker (n 97) 279–80 (providing empirical evidence of the grow-
ing proportion of treaties with ‘safeguards’ clarifying the meaning of expropriation); 
UNCTAD (n 22) 9 (noting some 35% of the investment treaties sampled between 2012–
2015 contain criteria clarifying the meaning of indirect expropriation, and listing treaties 
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innovations came just before the rise of the police powers doctrine in arbitral 
jurisprudence, captured most starkly in the Methanex award, and in the wake 
of the Metalclad case which had endorsed a particularly broad definition of in-
direct expropriation that had been subject to criticism.103 Thus, one plausible 
reading of these developments is that later arbitral tribunals have been influ-
enced by states’ attempts to refine the meaning of the indirect expropriation 
norm, even when interpreting older investment treaties that do not contain 
additional provisions clarifying the meaning of this standard.104
Turning in greater detail to the treaty-drafting innovations aimed at control-
ling the meaning of the indirect expropriation standard I will use as a focus 
the Annex addressing expropriation within CETA,105 which was included in 
a largely identical form in the EU’s proposed TTIP text.106 The first notable 
innovation is that CETA’s Annex seeks to define when a measure has ‘an ef-
fect equivalent to direct expropriation’, a matter left open by earlier treaties, 
by introducing a threshold that the measure ‘substantially deprives the inves-
tor of the fundamental attributes of property in its investment, including the 
right to use, enjoy and dispose of its investment, without formal transfer of 
from 2011–2015, including regarding whether they define indirect expropriation, in Annex 
Tables 1–5).
103   In the set-aside proceedings in the Canadian courts Justice Tysoe, although not setting 
aside the Award in this respect, noted the Metalclad tribunal’s definition of expropriation 
was ‘extremely broad’ and could ‘include a legitimate rezoning of property’, see United 
Mexican States v Metalclad [2001] BCSC 664 (Decision of 2 May 2001) para 99.
104   Federico Ortino, ‘Defining Indirect Expropriation: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Approach and the (Elusive) Search for “Greater Certainty”’ (2016) 43 LIEI 351, 
354 (text at fn 11); Kriebaum (n 48) 465. Consider in this regard Philip Morris v Uruguay 
(n 27) paras 300–1 (citing such treaty-drafting developments as support for the existence 
of a police powers doctrine in a treaty that did not explicitly recognise such an excep-
tion). It should be noted that other factors, beyond states’ adoption of expropriation an-
nexes, may also help explain certain tribunal interpretations. For example, the Methanex 
formulation of the police powers doctrine closely follows the formulation advanced 
in the United States’ memorial, see Amended Statement of Defense of Respondent 
(5 December 2003) paras 409–411 <www.state.gov/documents/organization/27063.pdf> 
accessed 29 May 2017. Furthermore, this aspect of the Methanex award can arguably be 
seen as, in part, responding to the unusual public attention the case had attracted, see 
Tienhaara and Tucker (n 97) 267.
105   CETA (n 23) Annex 8-A.
106   EU TTIP Proposal (n 61) Annex I. In contrast, the expropriation annex in the TPP con-
tains fewer innovations and largely resembles the approach introduced by the 2004 US 
Model BIT (n 101), see TPP (n 23) Annex 9-B.
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title or  outright seizure’.107 While the reference to a ‘substantial deprivation’ 
is a codification of established arbitral interpretations,108 the requirement 
that it relates to ‘the fundamental attributes of property ... including the right 
to use, enjoy and dispose’ of an investment is an intervention which seeks to 
push the indirect expropriation norm in the direction of those awards which 
have emphasised the need for a measure to substantially deprive the investor 
of its proprietary rights, such as the control or use of an investment, rather 
than merely causing a reduction in the value of the investment.109 However, 
CETA leaves unresolved whether other ‘fundamental attributes of property’ 
may exist – given the use of ‘including’ – and whether ‘a right to the “value”’ of 
an investment could be interpreted as such an additional attribute.110 Even if 
the latter interpretation is not adopted, a question remains of whether a reduc-
tion in the value of an investment may at some (extreme) point be held to con-
stitute a ‘substantial deprivation’ of the right to ‘use, enjoy and dispose of ’ an 
investment.111 Again, what this suggests is that significant discretion is left for 
future arbitral tribunals both in interpreting the precise content of such ‘new 
style’ investment treaty provisions and in applying them to specific disputes.
The second paragraph of CETA’s expropriation Annex slightly extends a 
list of factors first included in the 2004 US Model BIT which must be consid-
ered in determining whether a measure constitutes an indirect expropriation. 
These factors are drawn from Penn Central, the leading US domestic case on 
107   CETA (n 23) Annex 8-A, para 1(b).
108   See eg Chemtura (n 16) para 242; El Paso (n 1) para 255; Sempra (n 50) para 284; Pope & 
Talbot (n 94) para 102; CMS (n 49) paras 262–63.
109   See especially El Paso (n 1) paras 245–56 (reviewing prior arbitral jurisprudence to make 
this point); Pope & Talbot (n 94) paras 100–2; Sempra (n 50) paras 284–85; LG&E (n 65) 
paras 191, 198; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award 
(24 July 2008) paras 463–64 (emphasizing the distinction between a substantial interfer-
ence with rights and economic loss); Chemtura (n 16) paras 244–49 (noting this ‘legal con-
troversy’ over what is required for a substantial deprivation but not settling it); Bonnitcha 
(n 92) 247–54 (classifying awards based on whether they focus on a measure’s effect on 
the value of an investment or on the investor’s proprietary rights).
110   Ortino (n 104) 357–58.
111   ibid 358. Some tribunals have endorsed the proposition that a measure which completely 
destroys the value of an investment would constitute an indirect expropriation, see eg 
Sempra (n 50) para 285; Tecmed (n 51) para 115; Venezuela Holdings BV et al v Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No ARB/07/27, Award (9 October 2014) para 286. See also Rudolf Dolzer and 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 118 
(arguing indirect expropriation extends to instances where an investor is substantially 
deprived of the value of an investment because the relevant criteria include ‘economic 
use and benefit’ of an investment, not just control).
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regulatory takings,112 and were utilised by US negotiators as a result of a 2002 
instruction from the US congress to ensure that investment treaty protections, 
and specifically provisions on expropriation, did not exceed the protections 
provided by US law.113 The innovations introduced by CETA in this area (and 
the EU’s TTIP Proposal) are relatively minor when read against the 2004 US 
Model BIT.114 The more remarkable point, from the perspective of the evolv-
ing meaning of the indirect expropriation norm, is the successful ‘exporting’ 
of the Penn Central factors,115 a domestic takings rule, into numerous invest-
ment treaties in the space of a decade or so. While it can be argued that the 
Penn Central factors are largely similar to the range of factors international 
tribunals consider anyway in delimiting compensable takings from legitimate 
regulation,116 their repetition in numerous treaties is an excellent example of a 
small number of influential states influencing the broader trajectory of inter-
national investment norms.117
112   Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978).
113   For discussion of this background, see Gary H Sampliner, ‘Arbitration of Expropriation 
Cases Under US Investment Treaties – A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn’t 
Bark?’ (2003) 18 ICSID Rev–FILJ 1, 35–39; Matthew C Porterfield, ‘International 
Expropriation Rules and Federalism’ (2004) 23 Stan Envtl L J 3, 41–43.
114   Compare US Model BIT (2004) Annex B, para 4(a) with CETA (n 23) Annex 8-A, para 2. 
For example, the instruction in para 2(b) of CETA’s Annex 8-A that tribunals must con-
sider the duration of a measure is new but simply codifies a consideration tribunals al-
ready emphasise, namely that a deprivation must be permanent rather than temporary to 
qualify as an expropriation. Paragraph 2(d) of CETA’s Annex 8-A states that in consider-
ing the character of a measure tribunals must consider the measure’s ‘object, context and 
intent’, whereas earlier versions of such provisions had simply referred to the character of 
a measure. This addition appears to reaffirm the existence of a police powers exception 
because consideration of the ‘object, context and intent’ of a measure will often be crucial 
to distinguishing legitimate regulations from compensable takings, even though a lack of 
intent does not provide a defence against an expropriation claim, see Newcombe (n 1) 
25, 41. For argument that the inclusion of intent as a factor is problematic, see Kriebaum 
(n 48) 465.
115   Anthony B Sanders, ‘Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn 
Central Test’ (2010) 30 Northwest J Intl L& Bus 339.
116   Sampliner (n 113) 11–15; Bonnitcha (n 92) 268.
117   For explanation of why ‘path dependency’ can develop in investment treaty design, where-
by certain drafting choices become entrenched in the investment treaty network, see 
Wolfgang Alschner, ‘Locked in Language: Historical Sociology and the Path Dependency 
of Investment Treaty Design’ in Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang (eds) Research Handbook 
on the Sociology of International Law (Edward Elgar) (forthcoming) <https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929762> accessed 11 September 2017.
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The third innovation regarding the meaning of indirect expropriation in-
troduced by the 2004 US and Canadian Model BITs and further developed 
in the most recent treaties is a provision which with some variations states 
that: ‘except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not consti-
tute indirect expropriations.’118 A major unresolved ambiguity regarding this 
type of provision is what constitutes ‘rare circumstances’. CETA, and the EU’s 
TTIP proposal, attempt to clarify what constitutes ‘rare circumstances’ by re-
ferring in the singular to ‘the rare circumstance when the impact of a mea-
sure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears 
manifestly excessive’.119 Compared to earlier treaties which did not define ‘rare 
circumstances’ this provision reduces the interpretive discretion of future ar-
bitral tribunals. However, the content of this provision could be made clearer 
by specifying a methodology which is to be utilised by tribunals in undertak-
ing the balancing exercise the provision mandates between the impact of a 
measure on protected investor interests and the public policy purpose pur-
sued.120 Furthermore, even if a specific methodology, such as least restrictive 
means testing, were specified, including such a balancing test plainly delegates 
substantial discretion to the arbitrators charged with applying it.121 There is 
an important contrast here with a minority of investment treaties which have 
sought to do away with a balancing exercise – and the significant discretion at 
the level of application it necessarily delegates to arbitrators – by removing the 
qualification based on ‘rare circumstances’ entirely.122
118   2004 US Model BIT (n 101) Annex B, para 4(b).
119   CETA (n 23) Annex 8-A, para 3; EU TTIP Proposal (n 61) Annex I, para 3. The 2004 
Canada Model FIPA (n 101) was less successful in reducing this ambiguity because in 
defining ‘rare circumstances’ it referred non-exhaustively to ‘such as when a measure or 
series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reason-
ably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith’, see ibid Annex B.13(1) 
para (c).
120   Henckels (n 22) 43; Ortino (n 104) 362–3.
121   For an example of a treaty provision from outside the investment context which ex-
plicitly states that the applicable balancing technique is least restrictive means testing 
see Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1A (opened for signature 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 493, art 5.6 and fn 3.
122   Such treaties provide, without qualification, that non-discriminatory regulatory mea-
sures designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives do not con-
stitute an expropriation, see eg ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (n 102) ch 11, Annex, 
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This Part has shown that the content of the protection against indirect ex-
propriation has undergone significant evolutions over the last decade through 
contributions both by tribunals as treaty interpreters and states as treaty draft-
ers. The next Part moves back to the realm of application, a process dominated 
by tribunals, to demonstrate that in applying the indirect expropriation stan-
dard in concrete disputes, arbitrators frequently adjudicate on the permissible 
margin of host state regulatory change.
4.2 Managing Host State Regulatory Change by Applying the Indirect 
Expropriation Standard
My concern in this Part is with how tribunals have applied the indirect expro-
priation standard to particular disputes and in doing so have determined the 
permissible degree of host state regulatory change. As noted above, only a few 
arbitral tribunals have applied a true ‘sole effects’ test which rejects the idea 
that a measure’s purpose is ever relevant to whether it constitutes an indirect 
expropriation. Thus, accordingly to most arbitral awards, and the widespread 
treaty-drafting innovations outlined above, some form of police powers excep-
tion exists, whereby, although under different conditions, some forms of non-
discriminatory regulatory conduct may be held not to constitute an indirect 
expropriation. The idea of property which animates this view is a qualified and 
social one,123 where investments are ‘constituted, bounded and periodically 
redefined by regulation’.124 A good example of this view being applied is the 
Methanex case, where the Claimant challenged California’s ban on a gasoline 
additive. As part of its finding that the measure constituted a valid exercise of 
the authorities’ police powers, the Tribunal noted that Methanex had:
entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not notori-
ous, that governmental environmental and health protection institutions 
at the federal and state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the 
media, interested corporations, non-governmental organizations and a 
politically active electorate, continuously monitored the use and impact 
of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or restricted the use 
para 4; India Model BIT (2015) art 5.5 <www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/
Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf> 
accessed 11 September 2017.
123   Newcombe (n 1) 27.
124   Thomas W Wälde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
“Regulatory Taking” in International Law’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 811, 823.
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of some of those compounds for environmental and/or health reasons … 
the very market … was the result of precisely this regulatory process125
The key point is that in applying the indirect expropriation standard to the 
facts of the case, the international tribunal has itself determined the permissi-
ble balance between the investor’s interest in regulatory stability and the host 
state’s interest in adjusting regulation to address newly appreciated environ-
mental and public health risks.
The idea that legitimate regulatory changes can damage the commercial vi-
ability of an investment without constituting an indirect expropriation is also 
central to the reasoning in Feldman v Mexico,126 which involved a challenge 
by the Claimant to measures which prevented his company from accessing a 
rebate for the export of ‘grey market’ cigarettes. In rejecting the expropriation 
claim, the Tribunal noted that:
not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impos-
sible for an investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law 
or change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical 
to continue a particular business, is an expropriation … Governments, 
in their exercise of regulatory power, frequently change their laws and 
regulations in response to changing economic circumstances or chang-
ing political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may well 
make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.127
The Tribunal emphasised that Mexico was not required to permit ‘grey mar-
ket’ cigarette exports; nor did the investor have a ‘right’ to make such exports 
under Mexican law; and Mexico’s measure had a rational public policy basis.128 
Again, in applying the indirect expropriation standard to the facts the Tribunal 
has itself drawn the line between legitimate regulatory changes which make 
an investor’s business difficult or uneconomic, and changes which constitute 
a compensable taking.
Another set of cases which have required arbitrators to determine the per-
missible margin of regulatory change within the host state are disputes con-
cerning whether taxation changes constitute an indirect expropriation. The 
basic principle in this area was articulated by the Encana v Ecuador tribunal, 
125   Methanex (n 140) pt IV, ch D, para 9.
126   Feldman v Mexico (n 96).
127   ibid para 112.
128   ibid paras 111, 136.
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which noted that: ‘In the absence of a specific commitment from the host 
State, the foreign investor has neither the right nor any legitimate expectation 
that the tax regime will not change, perhaps to its disadvantage, during the 
period of the investment.’129 Applying this principle, the Tribunal noted that 
while the change in taxation laws had caused the Claimant to suffer financially, 
it had not ‘brought the companies to a standstill or rendered the value to be de-
rived from their activities so marginal or unprofitable as effectively to deprive 
them of their character as investments’.130 Similarly, those tribunals which 
have considered whether Ecuador’s windfall profits tax constituted an indi-
rect expropriation have emphasised that while this tax change clearly caused 
financial harm to the investors, it did not destroy the underlying investments.131 
Likewise, tribunals adjudicating on Argentina’s measures adopted in the con-
text of its economic crisis, including tax changes, have consistently recognised 
that while Argentina’s measures caused investors financial loss, they did not 
constitute indirect expropriations given investors were not substantially de-
prived of the control and use of their investments.132 In all of these examples 
it is international arbitrators, in applying the indirect expropriation standard, 
who are determining the permissible balance between host states’ interest in 
adjusting regulation to unforeseen circumstances, including in ways that cause 
financial harm to existing investments, and investors’ standard arguments in 
favour of certainty and stability.
It is illuminating to conclude this Part by considering the approach to reg-
ulatory change articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) in the Oscar Chinn Case,133 which has been cited by several investment 
treaty tribunals in holding that legitimate regulatory measures which nega-
tively impacted an investment, without depriving the investor of control or 
129   EnCana Corp v Ecuador, LCIA Case UN3481, UNCITRAL, Award (3 February 2006) para 
173. See also para 177.
130   ibid paras 174, 177.
131   Perenco v Ecuador (n 53) paras 685–89; Burlington (n 88) paras 430, 456–57; see also 
paras 391, 397, 404. This aspect of the Burlington award was subject to dissent, see Diss 
Op Arbitrator Orrego Vicuña, paras 21–27; The finding of expropriation in in Occidental v 
Ecuador (No 2) (n 85) para 455 concerned Ecuador’s termination of the Claimant’s con-
tract rather than its windfall profits tax. The Tribunal in Murphy v Ecuador (n 57) did not 
consider whether Ecuador’s measures constituted an expropriation, see para 294.
132   El Paso (n 1) paras 245, 256, 297–99; Total (n 1) paras 196–99; LG&E (n 65) paras 198–200; 
CMS (n 49) paras 263–64; National Grid v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award (3 November 
2008) para 154; BG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award (24 December 2007) 
paras 267–72.
133   Oscar Chinn Case (UK/Belgium) PCIJ Rep Series A/B Case No 63.
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enjoyment of the investment, did not constitute indirect expropriations.134 In 
Oscar Chinn the United Kingdom contended that Belgium, by heavily subsidis-
ing the costs of state-owned transport companies in the Belgian Congo, in the 
context of decreased demand during the Great Depression, had violated its 
international obligations and caused damage to Mr Chinn, a UK national and 
competitor in the river transport business. While much of the UK’s claim was 
based on a specific treaty regime providing for free trade and equality of treat-
ment, the UK also submitted that Belgium ‘by depriving indirectly Mr. Chinn 
of any prospect of carrying on his business profitably, constituted a breach 
of the general principles of international law, and in particular of respect for 
vested rights’.135 The Court rejected this argument, emphasising that Mr Chinn 
did not possess ‘a genuine vested right’, as opposed to a customer base and ‘the 
possibility of making a profit’.136 According to the PCIJ:
Favourable business conditions and goodwill are transient circumstanc-
es, subject to inevitable changes; … No enterprise … can escape from the 
chances and hazards resulting from general economic conditions. Some 
industries may be able to make large profits during a period of general 
prosperity … but they are also exposed to the danger of ruin or extinction 
if circumstances change.137
In assessing the circumstances of the case, the Court showed sensitivity to the 
dire economic situation in which the measures had been adopted, and ob-
served that private competitors to the partly state-owned transport provider 
had ‘no claim to any guarantee of profits from the State’.138 Like most contem-
porary arbitral interpretations of the indirect expropriation norm, the PCIJ’s 
Judgment reflects a qualified and social conception of property, whereby le-
gitimate regulatory changes may damage the value of an investment without 
constituting an indirect expropriation. As in contemporary investment trea-
ty arbitration, the PCIJ determined who should bear the costs of regulatory 
change: the foreign investor or the host state.139
134   LG&E (n 65) paras 197–200; Total (n 1) para 197, fn 232; See also El Paso (n 1) para 366 
(citing Oscar Chinn as authority for the proposition that ‘economic stability cannot be a 
legitimate expectation of any economic actor’).
135   Oscar Chinn (n 133) 87.
136   ibid 88.
137   ibid.
138   ibid 78–79.
139   Wälde and Kolo (n 117) 825.
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5 Conclusion
This article has sought to interrogate the various senses in which contempo-
rary investment law raises questions of change. Its key contribution has been 
to distinguish between questions of change in international investment norms 
themselves, and changes in a host state’s regulatory system which is subject 
to the control of such norms, and to explain how these different manifesta-
tions of change relate to the distinct, although interrelated, questions of the 
interpretation and application of investment standards. This framework was 
applied to the two most prominent and controversial international investment 
norms, the FET standard and the protection against indirect expropriation. 
This exposition demonstrated how the relative influence of arbitral tribunals 
and states differs markedly at the levels of interpretation and application. On 
questions concerning the interpretation of international investment norms, 
and potential changes in their meaning, arbitrators operate within wider pro-
cesses of law-development and share interpretive authority with states as treaty 
masters.140 Over the past decade states have been extremely active in redraft-
ing investment treaties to reduce arbitral discretion and increase their space 
for future changes in domestic regulation given the dynamic nature of con-
temporary policy challenges. While the treaty-based reforms reviewed in this 
article are unlikely to be entirely successful in removing ambiguity and arbitral 
discretion in the process of interpretation, current trends suggest states will in 
future take their role as treaty masters very seriously, for example by agreeing 
upon authoritative interpretations to counter undesired arbitral awards. Thus, 
if anything arbitrators’ influence over developments in the content of inter-
national investment norms as a general matter, or questions of interpretation, 
appears set to decline.
However, investment norms are notoriously fact-specific. Arbitrators domi-
nate the process of applying investment norms to specific investor-state dis-
putes. This application function frequently requires arbitrators to decide upon 
the permissible margin of regulatory change within the host state. Such deter-
minations go to the heart of the governance function performed by investment 
treaty arbitration in developing acceptable standards of host state conduct.141 
So long as investment treaties provide investors with access to international 
arbitration against host states, arbitrators are likely to play a key role in mang-
ing change in this sense.
140   Roberts (n 3) 191.
141   See above n 43.
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Stability and change are timeless concerns in international investment 
law.142 This article has provided conceptual clarity which helps us understand 
what is at stake when we speak of this tension, and the various senses in which 
it manifests itself in contemporary investment law. With the investment re-
gime at a crossroads, it is quite possible we will see significant shifts in the 
content of investment norms as a general interpretive matter; in the degree of 
host state regulatory change arbitrators are willing to tolerate in specific dis-
putes as they seek to arrive at more balanced decisions; and in the structural 
and institutional features of the regime.
142   Martin (n 91) 38.
